

Friends, I'm privileged today to have Melvin Goodman on World Focus. Mel began his career in intelligence with the US Army, where he worked as a cryptographer. He went on to teach at the National War College as a professor of international security and is currently adjunct professor at John Hopkins University and senior fellow at the Center for International Policy. Mel has just written an important book about people who are not afraid to talk. Welcome, Melvin Goodman.

Mel: Thank you Blase, good to be with you.

Blase: How did you decide to write this recent book?

Mel: Well, it was an easy decision to make. I was with the CIA for 15 years. It was extremely challenging and important, and a lot of good work was done. Then in 1981, a very conservative president, Ronald Reagan, picked a very conservative ideologue by the name of William Casey to be the CIA director. His job was to politicize the intelligence. Ronald Reagan wanted to increase defense spending to unprecedented levels in peacetime, and he needed a threat to justify that increase. That threat, of course, was the Soviet Union. So just as the Soviet Union was beginning its ten year decline before it collapsed in 1991, Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, who went on to become a secretary of defense in both the George Bush and - unfortunately - even the Barak Obama administrations. They politicized the intelligence and magnified the Soviet threat. So instead of reporting the decline that the Soviet Union was in, the CIA was charged with making this the greatest possible threat that could be depicted. And I thought this for about five years, from 81 - 86, and after five years decided I could perform better services for my government in other ways, so I joined the faculty of the National War College. Then, of course, in 1991, when George HW Bush nominated Gates to be the CIA director, I decided enough was enough, that the person responsible for falsifying the intelligence, spinning the intelligence, politicizing the intelligence, shouldn't be the head of the CIA. And I went to the intelligence committee and eventually testified in closed session and then open session against the confirmation of Robert Gates.

Blase: Well, your book is called *Whistle Blower at the CIA: An Insider's Account of the Politics of Intelligence*, just was released in May. Dan Ellsberg certainly is impressed with it. He writes: "This book offers a fascinating glimpse into the secret, behind-the-scenes world of US intelligence. Melvin A Goodman's first person account of the systemic manipulation of intelligence at the CIA underscores why whistle blowing is so important, and why the institutional obstacles to it are so intense. At its core, it's an invaluable historical expose, a

testimony to integrity and conscience and a call for the US intelligence community to keep its top leaders in check. A timely, urgently needed book."

Well, today there were some ICBMs fired from California here, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and they've been firing them from here for decades. Vandenberg is not that far from here - a couple hours drive or less. I wonder why we're doing that.

Mel: Well, when I got into the arms control business in the 1970s, I was the intelligence advisor to the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (71-72), when we actually completed two very important agreements with the Soviet Union: The SALT Treaty, to limit offensive missiles, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, to actually make sure there would be no missile defenses, which would justify large increases in offensive capabilities.

I've been to Vandenberg. I witnessed a missile launch at Vandenberg when I took some courses there. What we're doing now I think is a very dangerous kind of provocation to try to keep pace with what we're seeing out of North Korea. So instead of using diplomacy, we're using to for tat responses because you have a president who has no institutional memory and is totally ignorant of the North Korean situation. Unfortunately, he's surrounded himself with generals, and generals, of course, serve a useful purpose - they're operationally talented, tactically talented - but they're not strategically talented. It's very rare to find a general officer who is also an expert in genuine strategy and diplomacy. And this is a day and age that calls for diplomacy. We need it now with Russia, we need it with China. We developed a very good agreement with Iran with the nuclear accord; that was an achievement of not only bilateral diplomacy but also international diplomacy. And I think the same thing could be done with North Korea. But you have to talk, you have to understand what the leverage points are, you have to understand what the North Koreans are interested in and why they are launching the missiles that they launch. And you have to understand the impact of US / South Korean military exercises on North Korea. I don't think anyone in this administration who has any appreciation for these fine details of diplomacy. The one officer who isn't a military officer, a civilian who happens to be Secretary of State, seems totally ignorant of a lot of these issues and has surrounded himself with no one of any real expertise. So if you look at the 24 top positions at the state department, only two of them are filled. There's just no expertise or institutional memory, no strategic thinking, no understanding of the role and importance of diplomacy. So I'm quite concerned about where we're going with any of our bilateral relations, with a president who flies by the seat of his pants. We're in very difficult times.

Blase: Many of us have been doing private diplomacy for years. Here's a group that just came back from North Korea, Medea Benjamin and others, and their view is that tensions are exploding on the Korean peninsula. They demand an immediate response to North Korea's offer to freeze its nuclear program. Now apparently we've always been able to speak to North Korea, but we have had, as you have brought out so well, an unwillingness to talk. The question always seems to be do we bomb or don't we bomb? I think in a civilized society we find other things apart from that bifurcation. How do you feel about the civilian delegations? I know I've been on many of them, and sometimes we don't always feel welcome with the US agencies. Do you think that this is worthwhile?

Mel: Oh, I certainly do. I'm a great believer in what Eisenhower called people to people diplomacy. I think it's very important to keep all of these openings, all these channels, active, because you never know what signals will be sent or received at any particular time. I know that Americans who have been successful in going to North Korea - a short and very distinguished list, that includes people like former president Jimmy Carter, or a good friend of mine, Sally Harrison, a journalist who travelled to North Korea on many occasions. The former governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson. There are people who the North Koreans would talk to, people who have credibility in North Korea. But there seems to be no understanding of what it is that concerns the North Koreans, and how vulnerable they feel with the heavy US military presence in South Korea and the very aggressive military exercises. You mention the North Korean proposal for freezing their nuclear tests if we would freeze our joint military exercises with South Korea. Well, the Chinese have been telling us that for the last year. And the last year of the Obama administration, I don't think there was much interest in this, John Kerry was preoccupied with Iran, Susan Rice was not that capable as a national security advisor, but we're paying no attention to the Chinese attempt to at least start talks. Winston Churchill said "Jaw jaw jaw is better than war war war." There's no need for confrontation with North Korea, and there's a lot that we can offer that North Korea is interested in. A peace treaty, for example, to complete the end of the Korean War from the 1950s. There was an armistice, but no peace treaty. There should be an embassy in Pyongyang. It's ridiculous that when you look at the two countries that seem to concern us the most in terms of propaganda would be Iran and North Korea. Well, we don't have diplomatic relations with either one of them. We should have embassies in these places. One of the reasons we know so little about Iran and North Korea is that we don't have embassies there, we don't have experts on the ground, we don't have intelligence collectors because they work out of embassies. So there should be an embassy in Tehran. And Pyongyang. And there should be dialogue, not this ridiculous tit-for-tat thing of exercises and North Korean missile launches, and now an ICBM firing, and talk of High Altitude Missile Defense, which I'm not convinced is

even workable. We put so much money into missile defense - I wrote a book on that called *The Phantom Defense*." It doesn't work. We've never developed a strategic missile defense that can tell the difference between a decoy warhead and a actual warhead. So the formula we have in California and Alaska is a waste of resources and a waste of energy. We need diplomacy, and we need diplomats - and this administration has neither one.

Blase: We should learn how to talk to people. It's so much cheaper, for one thing. We could have four or five hundred diplomats learning how to love kimshi, and they would get to know each other and talk together, and we'd see what a tiny country it is and how every single city in that country was destroyed and possibly the highest percentage of civilian casualties in any war. I've see studies showing that upwards of thirty percent of the people of North Korea were killed in that war. And now we're sad to say that South Korean President Moon announced that he would allow the US to deploy four additional THADD anti-missile systems, reversing his previous position. I'm afraid that the only thing we said to the South Koreans was: "We're in charge here." The president of South Korea seemed quite liberal, but now he seems to have been overwhelmed. What do you think?

Mel: I share your disappointment. I was relying on Moon to reverse the strategic thinking in South Korea. He wanted to open a dialogue with the north, he wanted to establish the enterprise zone in North Korea, he wanted to do more with family reunification, and he was a critical of the THADD high altitude missile defense. So somewhere along the line he's been coopted. The instability of the North Korean leader, his unpredictability may have contributed to this, but the real problem is the instability and unpredictability of the US leader. When you have two horses such as that as heads of states, you have a real worry on your hands. I'm sure the South Koreans would like to tamp down this tension. There's a saying: when the elephants fight, it's the grass that gets trampled." Well, South Korea could be the grass in any US / North Korea exchange. South Korea is incredibly vulnerable. They're created a modern state with a capitol that's no only within missile range, it's in artillery range, and the North Koreans have about ten thousand pieces of artillery just outside the demilitarized zone. It's time for talk. It's time for negotiations and dialogue. You need institutionalized dialogue at every level with no only North Korea but with Iran, Russia, China. And we're just not getting it with this administration, and with this weak secretary of state that we have, I don't know where it's going to come from. I don't expect it to come from General Kelly, the White House Chief of Staff, I don't expect it to come from Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, or General McMaster, the National Security Advisor. It has to come from a high ranking civilian official, and one of the things that Trump has

totally ignored is the founding father's wish for civilian control of the military. That was part of their thinking. Part of the thinking certainly of Alexander Hamilton and George Washington and others. This has been lost. And we still have too many newspapers and pundits who think these are moderate and modest generals and that they will stabilize the situation. I'm not that confident. We have a situation that's totally out of control.

Blase: I join you in your concern. Of course, they'd have to do their homework. Now I don't think the Chinese want Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons. So we might share something there if we talked. The Chinese fear is that North Korea's government could collapse and send millions of refugees fleeing across the border and effectively handing power over to South Korea, which in would mean putting an American ally on China's border. These are some of the concerns, and we need to identify which ones we might have in common. But you don't do that if you're not getting serious about the history, the background and what has happened in the past. All of the people say that the North Koreans are more than willing to talk. But as you've brought out, Mel, this has been a longstanding thing. I'll never forget being in Baghdad in January, 1991, again with a civilian delegation. We went to a dinner and spent five hours with Yasser Arafat. And he says, "you people won't talk, you won't talk with me, you won't talk with the King of Jordan, you're going ahead with this war. There's really no problem here but the fact of not talking. "You're locked into a lose lose situation." That's the last time I saw him, and the bombing began two weeks later and has continued for 27 years in Iraq. The formation of the Taliban in Afghanistan - did we have any reason to attack Afghanistan? Some people had committed a terrible crimes, and we thought they might be hiding there, these criminals, so we attack the entire country. That's like trying to blow up Chicago to get the mob. The lack of diplomacy is so obvious everywhere, and now, in Iran - would you care to speak to the Iran situation.

Mel: Well, you really have to start in 1953. We always say why should we trust Iran. Well, in Iran, why should they trust the United States? In 1953, they had a democratically elected government under Mossadegh, who was a socialist or left leaning, very independent, and the US and Britain that colluded in Operation Ajax not only to overthrow Mossadegh but to install the corrupt Shah who lasted in power until 1979. So to understand Iranian thinking toward the United State you have to understand the fact that we exercised regime change in Iran and it was immoral and illegal. Eisenhower was wrong, and he took the CIA in a direction that it should never have been taken. But Iran is a very pragmatic state with very talented people and a strong middle class and an increasingly effective economy. They're realistic. We resent their influence in Iraq, but the fact is that if we hadn't invaded Iraq, Iran wouldn't have that

influence. Iraq fought a war against Iran for ten years, and the US supported Saddam Hussein. We allowed him to buy weapons and provided him with intelligence including from satellite imagery to make his bombing runs against Iran more effective. But Iran realizes they have to be responsible players in a regional sense, and that's why they negotiated the nuclear agreement, which was a very effective international diplomatic venture because it included the support of the European states, Russia and China. As you said earlier, Russia doesn't want to see nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea and it doesn't want to see nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran. China feels the same way. So the basis for dealing with Iran could ultimately become the same template for dealing with North Korea, the four plus two agreement, where you have North and South Korea talking at one level, and then Russia, China, Japan and the US talking at another level. I think the North Koreans realize that they have a very negotiable instrument in their nuclear program, but they're not going to bow down to a precondition. Our precondition has always been, we don't talk to you unless you stop your nuclear testing and renounce your nuclear capability. Well, that's the only instrument they have of influence.

Blase: They feel they might have been destroyed if they didn't have them.

Mel: Exactly. They saw what happened in the ridiculous Axis of Evil speech that George W Bush gave in 2001 and 2002 linking in a very fatuous fashion Iran, Iraq and North Korea, and we attacked the country that had no nuclear program at all - of course, we falsified reports of a nuclear program but had no evidence. We didn't go after Iran but we attacked a country without a weapons of mass production capability. Kim Jun understands this, and he's obsessed with North Korean security - as he should be. There's a basis for understanding this, but when you talk about the need to understand history and culture, you're talking about the need to understand strategic thinking in all its dimensions. Not just tactics. We're just relying on military tactics, which has sent us on all these fools' errands. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.

Initially with regard to Afghanistan, and I think I have a slight difference with you here, we were right to use military force initially after 9/11. And we had a very limited goal, initially, which was to get Al Qaeda out of the country and possibly to turn over the government away from the Taliban. And we did that with 450 special operations forces from the Pentagon and the CIA. But then we should have turned the keys to the country over to the Afghans themselves. Instead we developed a force that is just as large and just as stupidly orchestrated as what the Soviet Union did in the 1980s. We put in over a hundred thousand forces and *we're still there, making this the longest war the*

US has ever fought, for a country that has no strategic value for the US whatsoever. Afghanistan should be dealt with by the Afghans and neighbors that has interests there, Iran, Pakistan, and China. What in the hell are we doing there? There's nothing to be gained.

Blase: The problem there is that the forming of the Taliban was part and parcel of our work and our opposition to the Soviet Union. Would you accept that approach...?

Mel: Well, the initial involvement in 1979 was a covert action even before the Soviets invaded. They invaded in December of 79. I was at the CIA that year and what many Americans don't know is that Brezinski, who was very anti-Soviet and working for Jimmy Carter, though it would be a good idea to start covert action in Afghanistan in the middle of that year. The Soviet decision was calculated in part because the US was trying to steal a march on Moscow in Afghanistan. But what we did was to magnify the Soviet threat, creating a much greater problem for US interests by supplying the Mujahadeen, many of whom are the most fundamentalist people, and who now are causing great problems for American interests. When you look at Helkmatayar and other factions, even Al Qaeda itself benefited from some of the CIA assistance. So it was an outrageously stupid decision on our part, yet if you read the memoir by Robert Gates, he calls it the greatest covert action that the United States and the CIA ever engaged in. Well, no! It was one of the worst strategic decisions we've ever made - not comparable to the invasion of Iraq, which is the worst decision any American president has made...well, not in my lifetime, but in all of American history. But it ranks up there among the worst decisions we've made in our history.

Blase: Well, some of the statements made by secretaries of state - well, I remember 64 years ago when the attack on Mossadegh, our secretary of state came back and said "*he's a madman.*"

Mel: Of course, when he was a reasonable, very intelligent, very popular leader in Iran. The British had a concern; they didn't want their oil interests to be nationalized. But we had the same problem in Saudi Arabia about this time and we participated in the nationalization and protected our interests, and we should have told the British was to follow our example in Saudi Arabia and do with the Iranians what we did with the Saudis. Instead we supported Britain and MI6 in Operation Ajax to overthrow the government. It was an incredibly stupid decision, and even at the last minute the CIA realized it was stupid and tried to call it off but they had a station chief there by the name of Kermit Roosevelt, who was related to Theodore Roosevelt, who wouldn't let go of the

operation. It was a disaster for American interests.

Every time the US has gotten involved in assassination and regime change it's been a disaster. Iran, a disaster. The Bay of Pigs, a disaster. The operation against Chile and Allende - both disasters. The operation against Diem in Vietnam in 1963, a disaster. The political plot to assassinate Lumumba in the Congo, and introducing Mobutu, the great tyrant in the history of Africa, to power in the Congo - a disaster. I can't think of any great strategic successes of covert action, but I can think of a lot of strategic nightmares and failures. If you go back to Truman's establishment of the CIA in 1947, it wasn't for covert action, cloak and dagger operations; it was for intelligence collection and analysis. And he's right about that. But look at the CIA and its history. Look at what it's become. Today you're dealing with a paramilitary operation.

Blase: Thank you so much for being with us today, Mel Goodman.

Mel: Thank you Blase, thank you for having me.

Well, friends, we've become a killer state. Domestically, by denying our people the right to healthcare and education, giving us the highest illiteracy rates for adults in the developed world. Imprisoning more than two million people, 90 percent of whom have had no trial. That's done by coercing plea bargains from people who can't afford good representation. By denying food the hungry people. One in four of our people are food insecure. By allowing banks to steal homes from low income people through mortgage fraud and robo signing foreclosures like the Foreclosure King, Steve Mnuchin, now treasury secretary in a kleptocratic regime run by a vulgar ignoramus. Giving huge amounts of taxpayer money to banks to cover their incompetence and outright thievery.

Then there's the matter of foreign policy. You know that sanctions mean that poor people don't get to eat. Those in government will be fine. They always seem to do very well. They don't suffer from food deprivation. However, sanctions hurt the poor. Starvation is being used as a weapon in Yemen, also cholera. We've seen the destruction of Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, endless attacks on other nations, so we've become a *killer state*, and we've been a killer state for many decades now.

We just talked with Mel Goodman about the Iran coup. And I think it's important for us to know some of the history. We have all sorts of references. At the National Security Archives, editors Malcolm Byrne and Mark Gasiorowski have given us some very good references to exactly what happened in Iran in 1953. It actually was a situation that started in the 50s, when Iran nationalized

its oil industry. This was done by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadegh. Every Iranian knows this history backward and forward, and they are very worried that it's going to be repeated.

So the Americans came across at first as kind of heroes. First the British Empire, which relied on their oil facilities in Iran for a lot of their income. They reacted violently, and the US was called upon to help them because they were allies. But the Truman Administration was not interested in getting involved militarily or even a covert coup because they were trying to get the British and the French and others to cut back on their colonial attitude. This is after WWII. Suppose in the 20th century there would be a different world, and at first we came across as kind of heroes, and got Russians out of the country, but then, in 1953, Eisenhower replaced Truman, and an entirely different attitude took hold. The US and British intelligence (we're talking about the CIA now) worked together to overthrow the same prime minister, Mossadegh, because they couldn't see any other way out of the crisis, which they believed the Americans feared above all might lead to some sort of Soviet intervention or Soviet back coup inside the country. That's how the coup came about in Iran. "Fear" of the Soviet Union.

So it's a murky story. Years have gone by. It's an emotional story. Whenever you have that combination, you have to be careful how you define your terms. What sources you use. Who you judge to be credible. But generally speaking, this was a country that had elections. There were a lot of times they were clearly rigged in Iran, but the consensus view is that Mossadegh was elected democratically. His move to nationalize oil in 1951 had wide support. Not by the British, but by the people of Iran who owned it. So it takes a long time to plan this kind of thing. The British had come originally during the Truman period trying to propose this. But the Truman people said no, we're not interested. So they waited til the next group came in. The main action was just after the election, and Eisenhower had just been elected. It took a little time for Eisenhower to come around, but in the spring of 53, a couple of months after he'd taken over, he and his top advisors had pretty much come to the conclusion that they wanted to move it. They were afraid, above all, of Soviet intervention or a Soviet advantage of some kind. And here, 60 years later, the same thing is going on.

The British mainly wanted "their" oil and the revenue that came from it. And they agreed to get rid of Mossadegh and put a plan together jointly that would be approved by Churchill and Eisenhower. Now that's in July of 1953. By the middle of August, the coup gets underway.

Malcom Byrne says - and I haven't gotten through the whole volume yet, but it's fascinating, Perhaps more interesting for historians than people coming to the issues for the first time. It fills in a lot of details and gives you different perspectives, American but from different agencies - CIA vs State Department vs White House - and fleshes out a great deal. You could take just one second, it's important to figure out and understand how we came to know what we know about the coup to this point. Up to last week, when the volume came out, the very first story about the coup came out just a year afterward in a magazine called the Saturday Evening Post. So someone at the CIA decided to leak the story, and it has a lot of detail. What we're talking about is the release of information about Operation Ajax and the overthrow of the government of Iran in 1953-54. Who was the key person in this? Well, we have Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore and a cousin of Franklin Roosevelt. An adventurer who was interested in *The Great Game*, they thought of it as a game, it's an old expression they used to use, and who was put in charge of this operation and a couple of decades later he decided he wanted to write about it so he did publish a book and there's an interesting story about how that got past the CIA censors. It gave a lot of detail about what was actually happening in Iran. Truman and even Eisenhower were really more interested in the strategic component. For them job one was to keep the Russians out. If the Russians got access to the oil, that would be a really terrible thing. We were still only a few years out from WWII and Western Europe is still rebuilding. Japan is still rebuilding. They need natural resources. They need oil. Lack of access would lead to serious political problems and possibly openings for the Russians.

Friends, this is information that just came out in 2017 about the coup in Iran and the "fear" of the Soviet Union at that time. I believe, that from that point of view, said Byrne, that the US side was worried about oil and that US companies were concerned about the commercial side. Of course, it's often impossible to separate the political from the commercial in US foreign policy. But in this case, the policymakers wanted to make sure that the Russians didn't get in. That was their concern." This is Malcolm Byrne speaking on behalf of the National Archives.

He's asked about the significance of this coming out now in the context of a Trump administration that has been very confrontational toward Iran. Rex Tillerson recently talked about how the US supports the "peaceful" transfer of governance in Iran. Effectively, soft regime change. Documents like these might be received in Iran today, which has been heavily influenced by its history and its memory of the coup over sixty years ago. It still looms large.

More recently, specifically since 2015, Iran's nuclear deal was signed with the P5+1 countries. The State Department under Obama and Kerry was very reluctant to do anything to stir the political waters in Iran, and they specifically said in the context of the state department that they didn't want to create problems or give the hardliners in Iran the opportunity to make mischief. Now this was during Obama's administration.

Now all of a sudden you have a change of regime in the US. And two months later a "decision" gets made by Rex Tillerson of the state department to release all of this material. You can't help but come to the conclusion he is taking the opposite course simply to be contrary. And so they now have turned the tide on the decision about Iran.

Then, back to 1989, the state department put out a volume of documents like the ones that came out last week. Just one problem: it didn't say a word about the CIA and British involvement in the coup. They pretended it was a spontaneous uprising in favor of the Shah. Isn't that amazing! That caused outrage in the historical community and led to resignations of people involved because it was so plainly a whitewash of history. We had plainly put in the Shah of Iran, a dictator, and kept him there because of oil.

You get a report from the ambassador on the day of the coup. "Amazing events are unfolding before our eyes in the streets of Tehran. Spontaneous support for the Shah..." this was just nonsense, friends. The department, to their credit, decided to produce a new volume and correct the misinformation. It's been over 25 years since that first report, but they finally came out with a new one last week, and we're grateful for that.

Kermit Roosevelt ignored orders to abort the coup because apparently it wasn't going well. But these new documents give detail about exactly how he went about being insubordinate and proceeding with the coup anyway.

As Melvin Goodman said earlier, the CIA coup in Iran took place 64 years ago and is an example of just one intervention after another that has taken place in our history. It's extremely important that we have these archives, and Malcolm Bynes is deputy director and research director of the non-governmental National Security Archives based at George Washington University. He runs the Iran project which aims at studying the two countries and bringing to light what actually take place in the coup 64 years ago. We're looking at a similar situation developing today.

We have so much going on and so many people speaking out. We're so proud of intellectual and artists in defense of humanity. People who know what is going on in our country. This is our America, and the people of the world stand with

Bolivarian Venezuela. This group includes Danny Glover, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, so many people who we might know, Peter Shay, and many experts on Latin America. And it states, speaking of the present now in Venezuela:

On the eve of the elections to the Constituent National Assembly, to be held July 30, an escalation of violence has intensified in an attempt to prevent this democratic process and the participation and expected victory of the Bolivarian people.

This escalation of violence unleashed by the national and international right against the people of Bolivar and Chavez, with the complicity of the media in their power, encourages and celebrates a fraudulent "plebiscite" organized by a National Assembly outside any constitutional legality and supports the heinous crimes of the terrorist guarimbas, which includes amongst other terrorist atrocities the burning of people alive. This same National Assembly has appointed, without any jurisdiction to do so, new judges to the Supreme Court in an attempt to falsely legitimize the spurious creation of a parallel government in opposition to the one legitimately established by the will of the people. The purpose is clear; to destabilize the country in order to prevent the victory of the election of the new Constituent Assembly, on July 30 and to create the conditions for a new stage in the subversive onslaught against Venezuela.

The US administration, with the complicity of puppet governments of the region and their main European allies, are preparing an armed invasion against the Venezuelan people - an intervention that our Latin America and the Caribbean cannot accept. Being confronted with that possibility, intellectuals, artists, and social movements are obliged to denounce and counter with all the means and resources at our disposal.

The historical message of Bolivar, is today more valid than ever before. The epic continuance between the children of Bolivar and Chavez, is also ours, because it has been a long and unwavering battle for dignity, sovereignty and self-determination of our peoples.

At this crucial time in history, we claim as our own the patriotic anthem of the beloved Venezuela: "United by bonds / made by heaven / all America exists / as a Nation". As one people and with one voice, we will fight for it.

Long Live Bolívar! Long Live Chávez!

That's the voice of Artists in Defense of Humanity. The interventions in Latin America, as you know, have been continuous, ongoing aggressive wars against

democracy and in support of dictatorship. Once again this is taking place in Venezuela, and the propaganda being distributed by our media is really quite pathetic. Just simply wrong.

I want to thank all of you for joining me today on World Focus.